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Anarchist Modernism
Jesse Cohn
Purdue University North Central
Will [the multitude] … replace old masters by new ones? Let it do its own work 
if it wants that to be done, and confide it to representatives if it wishes to be 
betrayed.
— Peter Kropotkin (239)
Betrayed! Betrayed!
— Franz Kafka (Metamorphosis 143)
On a rainy afternoon, Joseph K., having been for some time now 
accused by a mysterious but implacable Court, having finally dis-
missed his ineffectual lawyer, and gloomily aware that his case is 
not going well, meets a priest in an otherwise empty, darkened ca-
thedral. Through conversation, it becomes apparent that this priest 
is also connected with the Court—in fact, that he is the prison chap-
lain, and is fully familiar with K.’s case. Clutching at the possibility 
that this man has good intentions, K. decides to appeal to him for 
advice. What he wishes for now is no longer to find somebody who 
can intervene on his behalf—another Advokat  ‘lawyer’ or Vertreter 
‘legal representative’ to speak for him (186)—but to learn how to 
sidestep it, to “break out of it,” to “live outside the trial” (214):
Surely that possibility existed; K. had thought about it often in 
the recent past. If the priest knew of such a possibility, he might 
reveal it if asked, even though he himself was part of the court.… 
(Trial, 214)1
In his desperation, K. makes just such an appeal: “You’re an excep-
tion among those who belong to the court … I trust you more than 
I do any of them,” he says (215). The priest’s warning reply, “Don’t 
1
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deceive yourself ” is followed by the parable of the “man from the 
country [who] … requests admittance to the Law” (215-17). Dying 
at the threshhold of the Law, having spent the remainder of his life 
in a futile effort to persuade the doorkeeper to let him pass, he is 
told: “No one else could gain admittance here, because this entrance 
was meant solely for you. I’m going to go and shut it now” (Trial 
217).
As if in an effort to preempt the exegeses to which the novel 
would be subjected, K. and the priest then compete to interpret the 
story—a disputation at the heart of which is the question of trust 
and betrayal, of truth and deception. Together, they consider: Has 
the doorkeeper cruelly deceived the earnest petitioner, or has he 
earnestly represented a paradoxical truth? Is the doorkeeper in pos-
session of the truth, or is he himself a victim of deception? Should 
we question the doorkeeper’s representations at all, or are they be-
yond question simply because of the authority he represents? (217-
23). Here, just as K. comes tantalizingly close, not to finding entry 
to the Law, but to exiting the process that the entire novel consti-
tutes (and that gives it its German title, Der Prozeß, meaning both 
“The Trial” and “The Process”), he unwittingly reprises the role of 
the man from the country, the humble petitioner seeking admit-
tance (Derrida, Acts of Literature 217). Wearied by the priest’s ter-
rific display of sophistry, which drives him back and forth between 
mutually contradictory interpretations of the story, K. comes to the 
“depressing conclusion” that “[l]ies are made into a universal system 
[Weltordnung]” (Kafka, Trial 223).2
What a trap! K. is not entirely mistaken to conclude that the 
priest has given a kind of universal victory to falsehood: he has 
indeed shown the system of representation itself to be inherently 
unstable, untrustworthy, deceptive. What K. fails to grasp, as he 
relapses into his desire for certainty and finality, is that this inter-
pretive swerving also demonstrates the incoherence of the Law to 
which he craves admittance. To imagine a way of life that is outside 
the Law, that is before it (temporally) or beyond it (spatially)—what 
could this be but the most radical of all political ideas, the very idea 
of anarchy? And yet: if this possibility is what K. imagines, how-
ever darkly, what could be more comically pathetic than hoping, 
hopelessly, for a priest to reveal it? Isn’t the priest—who is, after all, 
2
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another agent of the Court—being terribly truthful when he warns 
K. not to trust him, like the Cretan of the famous paradox who an-
nounces “I am lying”? What would K. have done differently, how 
might he have lived his life, had he been able to follow the priest’s 
maxim: “Don’t deceive yourself ”? (215-17).
In Joseph K.’s world, almost anyone, even those to whom one 
looks for emancipation, may be linked to the Court. Alternatively, 
“[i]n the first part of [the twentieth] century,” according to the au-
thors of a recent volume on twentieth-century Czech intellectual 
life, “the artistic and literary endeavors of leading Czech writers and 
artists, more often than not, were linked to anarchism” (Nový et al 
192).3 There is certainly no shortage of such links where Franz Kaf-
ka is concerned. First of all, a number of sources allege that, at the 
invitation of his friend and correspondent, a poet, journalist, and 
active anarchist named Michal Mareš, who gave him a copy of Pe-
ter Kropotkin’s Reden eines Rebellen, Words of a Rebel, he attended 
meetings of the Czech anarchist circle, the Klub Mladých; there, he 
became acquainted with Czech modernists of anarchist tendency 
such as Stanislav Kostka Neumann, who would later publish Milená 
Jesenská’s Czech translations of Kafka (Wagenbach 72-73; Urzidil 
190; Dodd 27; Pawel 447).4 Even if these accounts of direct contact 
with the anarchist movement are discounted, no one disputes his 
familiarity with anarchist ideas through his reading: he read works 
by anarchists such as Kropotkin, Gustav Landauer, Émile Verhaer-
en, Mareš, Fráňa Šrámek, and Octave Mirbeau (Pan 5-6; Born et 
al 211-12, 221, 213, 44, 42); Mirbeau’s dark novel The Torture Gar-
den has been identified as a primary source for Kafka’s own “In the 
Penal Colony” (Burns; Anderson 177n5). Numerous references to 
Mikhail Bakunin, Kropotkin, Landauer, and Ernst Toller are to be 
found among Kafka’s diary entries and letters (Kafka, Diaries 1914-
1923, 118; Diaries 1910-1913, 303; Letters to Friends 237).
Moreover, although some have alleged that Kafka’s interest in 
anarchism was transitory, his correspondence indicates that it did 
not disappear with the outbreak of the First World War. In 1917, 
he continued to read Franz Pfemfert’s literary journal, Die Aktion, 
which regularly published works by anarchists such as Kropotkin, 
Bakunin, Rudolf Rocker, Erich Mühsam, Fritz Brupbacher, and Eli-
sée Reclus, as well as Verhaeren, Neumann, Šrámek, and Otto Gross 
3
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(Pfemfert 7.32, 2.69, 2.91, 5.57, 3.14), and several of his own stories 
were published alongside Landauer’s essays in Neumann’s Kmen 
and in Der Jude, the journal founded by their mutual friend, Martin 
Buber (Jamison 65n7; Institut für Textkritik). Kafka also planned to 
become involved with Gross’s project for an anarchist journal, to be 
titled Blätter zur Bekämpfung des Machtwillens ‘Journal for the Sup-
pression of the Will to Power’ (Brod 108; Kafka, Letters to Friends 
153, 167, 455n65). Only a few years before his death, and after the 
formal collapse of the organized Czech anarchist movement, Kaf-
ka seems to have remained avidly interested in anarchism (Gustav 
Janouch dates his first conversations with Kafka on this subject by 
reference to Mareš’s book, Přicházím z periférie ‘I Come From the 
Periphery’ first published in 1920 [Tomek 32-33; Born et al 193; 
Janouch 86-91, 207n33]); in any case, letters of 1922 find him still in 
contact with Mareš, whose work he is still reading with enthusiasm 
(Kafka, Letters to Friends 158, 165, 176, 153, 167, 455n65; Hayman 
286; Kafka, Letters to Milena 226).
And yet what would be the point of yet another argument that 
Kafka should be classified as an anarchist writer? Most of the litera-
ture on this subject goes little further than cataloguing these kinds 
of connections, then dutifully noting the thematic connections be-
tween anarchism and Kafka’s fiction—authority, bureaucracy, hier-
archy, power, and so on, frequently condensed into the recurring 
figure of “the Law.”5 The problem with these readings is that they 
conveniently overlook the ambiguity of this figure and of Kafka’s 
work as a whole. What exactly would it mean to attribute a political 
position to these writings?
A new wave of scholarship now makes it possible to rethink 
these questions from a fresh angle. This scholarship had yet to ap-
pear two decades ago, when critics such as Ritchie Robertson were 
able to dismiss Kafka’s engagement with anarchism as apocryphal 
or irrelevant (139-41).6 Since then, numerous studies have rediscov-
ered the role of anarchist politics in the development of modern-
ist avant-garde aesthetics—particularly in the visual arts, but also 
in literature. When we look more closely at the affiliation of Ezra 
Pound’s fragmentary, hermetic poetry, for example, with the anar-
chist politics of Dora Marsden’s journal, The Egoist, we can see the 
link between them in terms of a kind of politicized individualism 
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contesting capitalism, the state, and patriarchy—“a supreme ego-
ism,” in the words of Tristan Tzara, “wherein laws become insig-
nificant” (qtd. in Resina 375). As Uri Eisenzweig remarks, the link 
between anarchism and modernism is in “the fact of a common re-
sistance to the principle of representation,” or in other words, “an-
archist resistance to the legitimacy of narrative power” (81, 85, my 
trans.). Similar relationships to anarchist ideas appear in Stéphane 
Mallarmé’s Symbolism, Camille Pisarro’s Neo-Impressionism, Jean 
Cocteau’s Surrealism, Alfred Jarry’s absurdism, Pablo Picasso’s Cub-
ism, Hugo Ball’s Dada, Toller’s Expressionism, Kazimir Malevich’s 
Constructivism, and, in Prague itself, Neumann’s Decadence and 
František Kupka’s Abstraction. Behind the proliferation of different 
“anti-Realist styles,” as Harry Redner argues, “from the emotional 
distortions and exaggerations of Expressionism to the complete 
non-representation of pure Abstraction,” lies “an anti-representa-
tionalist aesthetic”—an aesthetic “anarchism” (288). What emerges, 
in short, is really a whole new political history of modernism, one 
which includes, along with fascist and progressive variants, an “an-
archist modernism” (Kadlec 2-3; Antliff). This rediscovered context 
gives fresh relevance to the hypothesis of an anarchist dimension in 
Kafka.
As soon as we turn back to Kafka, however, we can quickly see 
how giving him the same treatment as Ball, Picasso, and Kupka could 
be difficult. First of all, Kafka resists groupings and classifications; 
he is neither a Surrealist nor an Expressionist nor a partisan of any 
other -ism. He belongs nowhere: “I have hardly anything in common 
with myself ” (Kafka, Diaries 1914-1923 11). Moreover, his work 
seems to lack an essential trait of avant-garde modernism—indeed, 
the trait which most strongly links modernism to anarchism: its “re-
sistance to representation” (Kadlec 2). He does not, like Mallarmé, 
go “on strike against society,” shunning common or public language 
in favor of a transcendent “incommunicabilité” (Mallarmé qtd. in 
Halperin 50, my trans. Porter 11). As readers from Susan Sontag 
to Wilhelm Emrich have noted, Kafka’s works, particularly in their 
use of the genre of parable, do not forbid but actively solicit (and 
sometimes, as in the cathedral scene in The Trial, actually rehearse 
in advance) exemplary or figurative readings (Sontag 29; Emrich 
81). At the same time, these works are written in a basically realis-
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tic idiom, reflecting recognizable features of the modern, everyday 
world, and if this world is often represented as behaving in a bizarre 
or irrational manner, this by no means negates the plain meaning of 
the language in which this is reported. Much as the priest exhorts 
K. to show “respect for the text” (Trial 217), Kafka’s writings tend to 
insist on the literal, the public, the everyday meaning of words: “The 
power of their language,” says Sontag, “derives precisely from the 
fact that the meaning is so bare” (29). It is through this dogged, even 
excessive literalness that Kafka most effectively turns the ordinary 
meanings of words inside out, so that they become extraordinary; 
this is his often-noted technique of concretizing dead metaphors, 
reversing the very process of “figuration” by which, to return to the 
parable from The Trial, we allow ourselves to think of an abstraction 
like “the Law” as occupying a place, such that we can be summoned 
to “appear before” it (Koelb 11-13; Derrida, “Before the Law” 188). 
Kafka does not follow the trajectory of other anarcho-modernists, 
such as his countryman, Kupka, towards increasing “anti-represen-
tationalist” abstraction and hermeticism (Leighten, “White Peril”; 
“Réveil anarchiste” 27, 26n34). Why?
Perhaps we could see Kafka as taking a middle way between 
two of the imperatives posed by his book of Kropotkin’s collected 
writings, Words of a Rebel. The first imperative is to resist and op-
pose the falsehoods of majoritarianism—the privileging of a passive 
collectivity over the complete freedom of the individual—and its 
supposed realization in representative government, which inevita-
bly entails the transfer of power away from the represented:
Representative government had as its aim to put an end to per-
sonal government .… Yet it has always shown the tendency to re-
vert to personal government and to submit itself to a single man 
… What, in fact, is asked of voters? To find a man to whom they 
can confide the right to legislate on everything.…  (Kropotkin 
71, 127, 132)
No individual can represent the collectivity—and, vice versa, no 
anonymous collectivity can substitute itself for the uniqueness of 
the individuals and minority groupings who comprise it; as was de-
clared by the editors of the anarchist journal Volný Duch (‘Free Spir-
it,’ 1894-1896), “The custom of allowing oneself to be represented, 
the recognition of authority, must necessarily hinder the individual 
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principle” (qtd. in Tomek 19). That is to say: don’t trust anybody to 
legislate for you; that delegation of power, that free mandate, cre-
ates a representative who need represent only himself—a floating 
signifier, free of reference. To borrow the words of a Czech anarchist 
motto: “nevěřte nikomu, nevěřte ani nám!”  ‘don’t trust anybody, 
not even us!’ (Slačálek).7
The other imperative we find in Words of a Rebel is Kropotkin’s 
call to the artist to shun the egotism of art for art’s sake and “put 
your pen, your brush, your chisel at the service of the revolution”:
Retell, in your prose rich with images or on your gripping can-
vases, the titanic struggles of the peoples against their oppressors. 
… Show the people what is ugly in present-day life, and put your 
finger on the causes of that ugliness; tell us what a rational life 
might be if it did not have to stumble at every pace because of the 
ineptitude and the ignominies of the present social order.  (58)
It is tempting to gloss these two imperatives as do not represent!—
the imperative of anti-statism—and you must represent!—the im-
perative of social realism. However, on closer inspection, they are 
more complicated than that. When Kropotkin asks for art to depict 
present-day life, he also asks for it to “tell us what a rational life 
might be” (58). This utopian moment within Kropotkin’s variety of 
social realism—what was, in fact, called l’art social by the anarchists 
of the fin-de-siècle—consists in a certain departure from the actual 
in favor of the might be, the possible.8 As Daniel Colson writes, “the 
emancipatory project of anarchism consists in its opposition to ev-
ery mutilation of possibilities” (Trois Essais 16, my trans). Thus, the 
politicized art Kropotkin calls for cannot merely reproduce what is 
ugly in present-day life in the manner of Zola’s Naturalism, which 
is incapable of pointing to any possibility beyond the present mis-
ery. Indeed, in the same essay, Kropotkin condemns the Naturalist 
aesthetic which, “lacking a revolutionary ideal,” substitutes for it the 
“realism [which] represent[s] meticulously, in prose or verse, the 
suffocating mud of a sewer” (53-54).
On the face of it, Kropotkin’s demands, the demands of l’art so-
cial, might seem impossible to satisfy. What form of representation 
both shows the actual, unflinchingly cataloguing the ugliness con-
cealed behind idealizing discourses, and at the same time refuses 
and transcends that ugliness in favor of the ideal? What art could 
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ask us, at one and the same time, to trust in its representations and 
not to trust any representation at all? For it seems that in Kropot-
kin’s phrasing, what anarchism calls for is not simply a resistance 
to narrative or a rejection of representation, whether in the form 
of pure art or even of anti-art: it calls for a kind of representational 
art which must constantly fight off the reifying tendencies of repre-
sentation—namely, the illusions of sameness and false concreteness, 
the surreptitious subtraction of change and potentiality from the 
real.
Kafka, too, is a representational artist—a representative man, as 
Frederick Karl has it—who is at war with these tendencies in repre-
sentation. Valerie Greenberg points to the way that Kafka’s style is 
defined by a peculiar use of qualifiers (such as allerdings ‘however,’ 
‘though,’ ‘on the other hand’) in combination with the subjunctive 
to deny us any real certainty about what information can be trusted. 
Some of what the stories report, Greenberg argues, is represented 
as reliable by the narrative voice; however, this reliable content is 
usually represented as “contrary to fact” (95-96, 98). If this is a form 
of narrative representation, it is a strange one, since it constantly 
reminds us that the words of the text re-present or make present 
again what never was present and may never be so. Moreover, by 
privileging the possible over the actual, Kafka’s writings tend to sur-
reptitiously de-presentify what is present: the concrete, mundane, 
everyday world, seen this way, starts to look more and more spec-
tral, unreal, fantastic. “All is imaginary [Phantasie],” Kafka writes in 
his diary: “family, office, friends, the street, all imaginary, [whether] 
far away or close at hand … the truth that lies closest, however, is 
only this: that you are beating your head against the wall of a win-
dowless and doorless cell” (Diaries 1914-1923 197).
This apprehension of even what is close at hand as somehow 
intangible, imaginary, marks both Kafka’s answer to the challenge 
of Kropotkin’s critique of representation and, at the same time, his 
departure from Kropotkin’s conception of l’art social as a kind of 
realism that could express utopian longings. Kafka’s writing, on its 
face, is dystopian, not utopian. How is this to be explained? Michael 
Löwy suggests that Kafka’s excoriation of the fallen state in which we 
live constitutes a kind of utopia negativa, a ‘negative anarchism,’ as if 
by showing us the Penal Colony we inhabit, Kafka might provoke us 
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to reject and abandon it, as does the traveler in the story; however, 
this relentless negativity leaves it open to the conclusion drawn by 
Kropotkin’s biographer, George Woodcock, that Kafka’s writing is 
so wedded to horror and despair that it effectively makes it impos-
sible for us “to see any alternative to authority” (Löwy, Redemption 
81; Kafka, Metamorphosis 226-27; Woodcock 183-84).
Certainly there is something to Woodcock’s charge. The truth, 
for Kafka, is that we are locked in a perfect prison, “a windowless 
and doorless cell” (197). However—allerdings!—note that this car-
ceral arrangement, in its very perfection, is both pointless and im-
possible. It is impossible, because being without entry or exit, it can 
no more admit a prisoner than it can release one; it is pointless, 
because carcerality depends on the concept of discipline, and a cell 
that cannot admit or release a prisoner is incapable of imposing any 
discipline whatsoever. In conventional logic, the category of the ac-
tual excludes the impossible and subsumes the possible; for Kafka, 
our actual world, the truth of the carceral society, is an impossibility, 
an absurdity. To read this representation of the truth is to be unable 
to rationally accept it as possible. Only the counterfactual, the un-
available might-be, would constitute a rational life.
It is only when we connect the insights of textualist interpreta-
tions of Kafka such as Greenberg’s with Kafka’s political context that 
we can begin to properly understand the role played by the domi-
nant trope of his fiction: “the Law.” Many commentators, noting 
the distinction between the Law (singular) and the laws (plural) in 
Kafka’s fiction, have suggested interpretations which make sense of 
the mysterious quality of the former in comparison with the latter 
(Ziolkowski 234-35). This irreducible singular, the Law, is “not gen-
erally known,” Kafka’s narrator explains, and may not “exist at all”; 
nothing is capable of representing it, and it is inaccessible (Kafka, 
Complete Stories 437; In the Penal Colony 148). What sense can be 
made of such an absurdity—an “unknown system of jurisprudence” 
(Trial, 61)?9
Several explanations have been proposed. Theological inter-
preters of Kafka tend to see it as a figure for the divine, the Ab-
solute (Brod 174-75).10 For these readers, Kafka’s writings consti-
tute a modern Kabbalah with a hermetic mystery at its core. On 
the other hand, Kafka’s secularist interpreters, noting the repugnant 
9
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and totalitarian character of the Law in Kafka, suggest that it repre-
sents something which is to be rejected; Theodore Ziolkowski, for 
instance, sees it as standing for “the antiquated laws of the Hab-
sburg monarchy,” irrationally preoccupied with personal guilt. For 
Ziolkowski, in this reading, Kafka’s The Trial is a contest “between 
the conservative values of the past and the progressive forces of 
modern society” (234-35).11 I would argue neither that the Law is a 
figure for an irrational sublime to which we must abject ourselves, 
nor that the laws are a figure for a progressive modernity which is 
to be championed. Instead, I would suggest that Kafka is showing us 
how our apparently intelligible, rational laws depend on and refer to 
an unintelligible and irrational Law.
Ordinarily, Gesetze, ‘laws,’ are written and public documents 
meant to govern behavior, action-governing texts (things that have 
been gesetzt, ‘set down,’ in writing): they must be so, for the rewards 
or punishments they specify must be known to all relevant parties 
in order for them to be effective, to elicit compliance, to acquire 
perlocutionary force. The laws are supposed to determine what 
shall be done to individuals who engage in some behavior (or fail to 
engage in that behavior): when I do what a specific law commands 
or forbids, I am to receive a specific reward or punishment. Life 
governed by laws is an alienated form of life in which justice is con-
stantly identified with something external to action (the extrinsic 
reward or punishment), as if nothing contained its own justification 
within itself; hence, as George Benello remarks, the world of laws 
and legality is fundamentally “based on coercion and … bribery” 
(79).12 The trouble with laws as behavior-governing signs, however, 
is that their meanings are always underdetermined: they must be 
interpreted in order to mean anything, and this task inevitably falls 
to special classes of individual officially invested with the authority 
to interpret the law. In effect, as the narrator of Kafka’s story, “The 
Problem of Our Laws,” remarks, “The Law is whatever the nobles 
do,” i.e., whatever the authorities entrusted to execute the laws do 
(Complete Stories 437). Indeed, this remark captures the essence of 
an anarchist critique of authority as
a way to secure compliance with a directive, distinguished by the 
ground on which the directive is obeyed. You exercise authority 
over my conduct if you issue me a directive, and I follow it be-
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cause I believe that something about you, not the directive, makes 
compliance the proper course.  (Ritter 66)
This is precisely what Kafka identifies, in his famous 1919 letter to 
his father, as “the enigmatic quality [das Rätselhafte] that all tyrants 
have whose rights are based on their person and not on reason” 
(Dearest Father 145). Laws require authorities to interpret them, and 
interpretive authorities produce not reasons but Rätseln, ‘riddles.’
The only recourse we have against such a cynical conclusion is 
the appeal beyond the written letter of the laws and its human inter-
preters to the unwritten spirit of the laws. This spirit of the laws—
Gustav Landauer would have called it a spook or phantom—is taken 
to be at once the ground of the codified, written law, and at the same 
time, above the limitations of written discourse; it is supposed to be 
both the center of the system of textual meanings and radically out-
side the system, just as God is supposed to be the ground of the vis-
ible world and at the same time beyond it (Lunn 225; Derrida, Writ-
ing and Difference 279). Law is always utopian, in the (derogatory) 
root sense of the word (ou-topos, ‘no-place’). This utopian moment, 
this irrational or fantastic element, is what Kafka calls the Law—an 
all powerful principle, as J. Hillis Miller puts it, which is at the same 
time totally unavailable to us. 
Herein lies the logic of Kafka’s critique of bureaucracy. Bureau-
cracy, according to Max Weber, is the rational form of organization 
in which authority is transferred from charismatic persons to im-
personal laws; it is designed to protect us from the irrational caprice 
of the charismatic ruler endowed with authority, just as representa-
tive government, the modern political form par excellence, was “to 
put an end to personal government,” as Kropotkin has it (Weber 
328-30). Kafka unmasks these arrangements as a pretense, or per-
haps as a farce: just as parliamentary representation reverts to per-
sonal government, so the pretense of the rational organization to be 
ruled by its own laws reveals itself to be a mystification—indeed, a 
utopia, an imaginary perfect world (Kropotkin 127). In this utopia, 
no person rules, only the laws are obeyed; democratic polities vol-
untarily obey a government of laws, not men. In reality, as Michel 
Foucault argues, it is just because the laws are impersonal that they 
can be bent to any purpose by the persons who are charged with ad-
ministering them (151).13 The bureaucrat, like Kafka’s doorkeeper, 
11
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stands with the laws behind him, but these laws themselves refer to 
a nothingness. Thus, in “The Refusal,” when petitioners from the 
village come to visit the administrator who governs their lives,
he stands there like the wall of the world. Behind him is nothing-
ness, one imagines hearing voices in the background, but this is 
probably a delusion; after all, he represents the end of all things, 
at least for us.  (Complete Stories 264)
The bureaucratic administrator is surrounded by an aura of unques-
tionable authority—that charisma, banished as irrational, which has 
returned as rationalized irrationality. The Law which gives him le-
gitimacy is always absent, its imagined presence merely a delusion. 
The bureaucratic world is the home of delusions, of imaginary pres-
ences, spooks and phantoms. So Kafka writes to Milena Jesenská 
that the bureaucratic office, seemingly the realm of the mundane 
par excellence, is actually the domain of the fantastic (Letters to 
Milena 126).
This fantastic quality is a bad omen for the project of which 
the office is a product—the project of Aufklärung, Enlightenment, 
the disenchantment of the world. In an enlightened world, supersti-
tious fantasy would be dispensed of in favor of knowledge: “The 
Enlightenment has always aimed at liberating men from fear,” write 
Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer (3). In the disenchanted 
modern world, however, it seems that the grotesque, the bizarre, the 
fantastic tends to irrupt all the more fiercely in the very midst of the 
rational order of things—and with it, irrational mystery and fear.
In this way, Kafka does not do what Kropotkin and Woodcock 
ask—namely, discover the utopian potentiality hidden within the 
concrete structures of actual society—but inverts and undoes the 
distinctions between the fantastic and the concrete, the possible and 
the actual, even utopia and dystopia. The Kafkan dystopia, the place 
of negativity, is always already a utopia, a no-place—not potentially 
but actually, as Walter Benjamin recognized when he wrote that “to 
speak of any order or hierarchy is impossible here” (117). In the 
process of stripping away what is apparently mere surface (the ma-
terial in which Law typically manifests itself, i.e., legal writings and 
the process of reading and enforcing them), bringing forth the pure 
substance (the idea of Law in its naked absoluteness), the thing is 
robbed of its utility, becomes end-less—meaning infinite, but also 
12
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without an end, i.e., goalless, pointless. Kafka’s carceral world is al-
ways already anarchy, the no-place without laws, precisely because 
it is the place where the Law has become everything and nothing.14
In order to undermine the representational systems on which 
law and authority depend, Kafka calls on the powers of representa-
tion, narrative power. He creates narratives which turn the rational-
ity of conventional realism against itself to rediscover mythic ter-
ror; narratives which reveal, behind the seeming transparency of 
representational language, a baffling opacity; which reveal, behind 
the seeming sense of words, a senselessness or silence. His work 
constitutes, in the words of Caroline Granier, “a realism which de-
nounces itself as an illusion” (my trans.). At the same time, however, 
he does not follow the path of the anti-representational modern-
isms that would hail silence or incomprehensibility as that which 
breaks with the Law, as an escape from the text into a radical outside 
(Moore 121). Instead, he reminds us that silence has always been the 
foundation of authority, the irrational kernel within Law’s rational-
ity, that, as Derrida has it, “the praise [éloge] of silence always takes 
place within logos,” the structure of representation (Writing and Dif-
ference 37; Of Grammatology 163). The freedom Kafka pursues does 
not appear to consist in a rejection of representation per se but in 
the construction of alternative forms of representation, both literary 
and political, that never allow power to place itself outside of the 
realm of dialogue, to disguise itself as the Absolute.15
These de-absolutized signs, these anarchist representations, 
would have to constantly remind us of their contingency, their 
makeshift nature, their merely relative adequacy relative to changing 
human needs—that “human nature, essentially changeable, [which] 
can endure no restraint” (Complete Stories 239). They would not 
promise utopia in the form of a transparent, manageable universe 
of immobile referents; they would not provide consolation (“the lit-
erature written by the anarchists,” as Granier puts it, “is not a com-
fortable literature” [my trans.]). In effect, these words would have to 
constantly whisper, “Don’t deceive yourself; don’t trust anybody to 
represent you, not even us.” This, perhaps, is the disquieting voice 
we hear in the background of Kafka’s fictions.
13
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Notes
1 Here and elsewhere, I cite Breon Mitchell’s translation. The Muir translation, 
taking more liberties with Kafka’s German, more poetically suggests “a mode of 
living completely outside the jurisdiction of the Court” (266).
2 All German quotations from Kafka taken from The Kafka Project, ed. Mauro 
Nervi (http://www.kafka.org).
3 If Kafka wrote his stories exclusively in German, Klaus Wagenbach reminds 
us, he was not linguistically confined to the community of German speakers in 
Prague, but “spoke and wrote good Czech”—indeed, he was “one of the few” 
writers in German who did (13).
4 Another one of the “founders of the Czech anarchist movement,” Michal 
Kácha, who told Brod of meeting Kafka through the Klub Mladých, also col-
laborated with Neumann as an editor of the avant-garde journal Červen ‘Red,’ 
published between 1918-1921, which Kafka also read (Löwy, “Franz Kafka and 
Libertarian Socialism” 120; Born et al. 200).
5 See, for example, Michael Löwy’s “Franz Kafka and Libertarian Socialism.”
6 Willy Prochazka also vehemently disputes the likelihood of Kafka’s involve-
ment with the Klub Mladých (275-87).
7 Note that while anarchism, like any social order, presupposes (and attempts 
to build) a considerable fund of trust between individuals, this trust is to be 
established through reciprocal and egalitarian relations, always revocable, 
never to be allocated to anyone merely by virtue of a position (Colson, Petit 
lexique 63, my trans.). Indeed, the fixation and routinization of the relationship 
of trust that is otherwise essential to any community is the step by which the 
community gives rise to a power that, while in reality springing from every 
point, appears to be located radically outside of itself. Here, one is reminded 
of Kafka’s description of the Castle which, while seemingly inaccessible, the 
ultimate “center elsewhere” (Derrida, Writing and Difference 279, original em-
phasis) is nonetheless, on closer inspection, nothing more than “a rather miser-
able little town, pieced together from village houses” (Kafka, The Castle 8). As 
Löwy points out, this paradoxical identity of the Castle with the “town, [of its] 
power” with the “submission [of] the whole population,” directly parallels the 
anarchist insight into the nature of political power (“Paper Chains” 50, 52-53), 
an insight most forcefully stated by Gustav Landauer in an essay of 1910: “we 
are the state—and are it as long as we are not otherwise, as long as we have not 
created the institutions that constitute a genuine community and society of hu-
man beings” (165, my emphasis).
8 Parisian anarchists’ theorizations of l’art social found a relatively rapid echo 
14
Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 8
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol35/iss2/8
DOI: 10.4148/2334-4415.1752
Cohn                           309
in Prague, where Arnošt Procházka commented on them in his Moderní revue 
pro literaturu.
9 That an unknown law is absurd, while intuitive—“How can citizens conform 
to orders,” asks Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, “if they are not notified of what the 
orders are …?” (General Idea 132)—asks for some thought. There have indeed 
been secret laws, which rank among the typical devices of totalitarian regimes. 
Moreover, as Proudhon observed, the very bureaucratic character of the juridi-
cal apparatus produces more laws than any citizen can rationally be expected 
to know, rendering most of them de facto if not de jure unknown (General Idea 
132). However, it is a commonplace of the juridical tradition that a basic re-
quirement for the rule of law that Kafka remarks on at the beginning of The 
Trial (“K. lived in a state governed by law … all statutes were in force” [6]) is 
publicity, i.e., the condition that the laws must be “explicit [and] transparent” to 
ordinary citizens (Trial 6; Fuller 670).
10 Brod shows himself altogether incapable of understanding the anarchism 
of a Michal Mareš when he blithely equates the Court and the Castle with di-
vine “justice and grace” (qtd. in Vašata 136); it is Edwin Muir, however, who is 
perhaps the worst offender in his insistence that for Kafka, “it is man’s duty to 
direct his life in accordance with this law whose workings he cannot under-
stand” (56). How can Kafka’s best friend and his most prominent translator 
both miss the point so badly? K. can never enter the Castle; no one can direct 
his or her life in accordance with an unknowable Law, and this impossibility 
ought to function as a reductio ad absurdum. Milan Kundera is far more clear-
eyed when he diagnoses the theological overtones of Kafka’s fiction as in fact 
“pseudotheological”—the same aura, I would add, that clings to every totalitar-
ian apparatus (102, original emphasis). In tracing an arc up from the all-too-
earthly to the pseudotheological, Kafka also allows us to see down into the root 
meaning of the word hierarchy, its foundation in the sense of the mystery of 
rule and command, the hieros ‘sacred,’ ‘holy’ arche ‘principle,’ ‘power,’ ‘source.’
11 Or, more facilely, the world of the Court and the Castle is identified with 
a totalitarian experience that can then be comfortably contrasted with our 
democratic lives (in which, as we all know, nobody is arrested in an extraju-
dicial manner, forbidden to know what crimes they are charged with, and so 
forth). Kundera objects to this reading that “in Kafka’s novels, there is neither 
the party nor ideology with its jargon nor politics, the police, or the army,” and 
that therefore they do not “correspond to a definition of totalitarianism” (106). 
This is not completely true—for instance, the army is prominently featured in 
“The Conscription of Troops,” “The Imperial Colonel,” “In the Penal Colony,” 
“The Refusal,” “An Old Manuscript,” etc. Why does Kundera elide the analogy? 
He wants to read Kafka existentially rather than historically, to avoid reducing 
his novels to political allegories: “the Kafkan represents one fundamental pos-
15
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sibility of man and his world, a possibility that is not historically determined 
and that accompanies man more or less eternally” (105, original emphasis). 
While I appreciate Kundera’s attempt to shut down easy explanations of Kafka’s 
work here, I would insist that Kafka’s works are political because they describe 
a world of domination, a political phenomenon. His writings are not merely ex-
aggerated descriptions of totalitarian relations, but hyper-exaggerated descrip-
tions of those relations which have the effect of revealing the essences of those 
relations, separating them from the historically-determined accidents of their 
specific modern manifestations (party, ideology, etc.) in much the same way 
that a chemist centrifuges a colloid to separate out its constituent parts and ex-
amine the heaviest sediments apart from the albumen. At the same time, these 
sediments are most emphatically not ahistorical, even if they are indeed pos-
sibilities inherent in the human condition; what Kafka reveals as the essence of 
the State as an organizational form is coercive power or domination. He reveals 
these as the rationalized faces of ancient mystery. This is the so-called theologi-
cal dimension of Kafka: his discovery of (to invert Marx’s phrase) the mystical 
kernel within the rational shell of the modern world (Marx 103).
12 Contrast this with the world of The Trial, in which favorable and unfavor-
able verdicts, for all intents and purposes, are dispensed at random, in which, 
to paraphrase the character Titorelli, no one can have “the slightest influence” 
on one’s fate (152).
13 See also Larry L. Tifft and Dennis Sullivan, The Struggle to be Human: Crime, 
Criminology, and Anarchism (58-59), on the discretion of both judges and po-
lice officers to interpret the Law.
14 It is a lawless place in the way that Orwell’s totalitarian dystopia is lawless: 
“In Oceania there is no law” (211). Hannah Arendt’s analysis of the relation-
ship between totalitarian violence, silence, and laws is pertinent here as well: 
“Where violence rules absolutely, as for instance in the concentration camps of 
totalitarian regimes, not only the laws—les lois se taisent, as the French Revolu-
tion phrased it—but everything and everybody must fall silent” (18, original 
emphasis). Again, the ironic closeness between utopia and dystopia is essential 
to the Kafkan universe: if the economic principle of Kropotkin’s anti-authori-
tarian communism is that money cannot and must not be asked to represent 
the value of anyone’s life and labor—the absolute repudiation of the distributive 
principle governing Kafka’s hated job at the Workers’ Accident Insurance Insti-
tute—the principle of the world of The Trial, once again, is that there is nothing 
you can do to secure rewards and avoid punishments, no rule you can observe, 
no command you can obey, to save yourself: “whatever you do,” as Kropotkin 
paraphrases the maxim of the military reprisals of 1871, “you will perish … You 
are … outside the law” (Kropotkin 100-01, 93-94).
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15 Cf. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon’s definitively anarchist declaration of his inten-
tion “to eliminate the ABSOLUTE” (De la Justice 3.249, my trans.).
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